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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

## Political Organization of the Chinese Communist Army

1. As soon as the Chinese Communists were in control of the entire continent of China, they made every endeavor to organize a modern army, bringing together the original Chinese Communist Army, its guerrilla units, and the Chinese Nationalist troops who had surrendered to them. To strengthen the power of this military organization and to be certain that it would act in accordance with the policies of the Communist Party, a powerful political organization was formed within the army. The organization apparently is a Party branch for those members of the Party in the army, but actually it was formed in order to control the army in accordance with the will of the Party leaders.
2. There are three systems of political organization:
  - a. Party sections for military members on all levels from the smallest Party cells to those for companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps.
  - b. Branch sections of the Communist Youth Association which are composed of troop members of that organization.
  - c. The group which directs political affairs, from the various political sections in the headquarters of regiments and higher units to leaders of companies and instructors at battalion levels.
3. In the headquarters of each regiment and higher unit there are a political commissar and an assistant political commissar who are of equal rank with the commander of the unit and actually are more privileged than the commander. The political commissar holds the additional post of chief clerk of the Party branch committee in a unit, and as the highest responsible person of the Party branch in the unit, sanctions and supervises Party, political, and military affairs. The assistant political commissar is also at the head of the political section of the Party unit, and is in charge of the execution of political policy as determined by the commissar. Each political section is divided into five subsections: organization, propaganda and education, surveillance, youth instruction, and popular movements. (See Attachment A.)

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4. The Communist Youth Association is comprised of soldiers of from eighteen to twenty-five years of age qualified to be candidates for membership in to Communist Party. They are educated and instructed by the Staff of the political section to be auxiliary members of the Party. The mission of this association is educating and training soldiers in Communist ideas, preventing their becoming reactionaries, and securing their cooperation in accomplishing the unit's military assignments. The mission is carried out in the following manner. To indoctrinate the troops in Communist thought, lectures are given, in the manner most popular to the soldiers, many of whom are ignorant children of farmers and workers, on the history of social development, historical materialism, the fundamental problems of revolution in China, neo-democracy and Communism, and political criticism of current topics. The objective is to implant a religiously superstitious faith in Communism in the troops. As part of their training in the principles of equality as expressed in Communism, officers and men alike are supplied with food, clothings, and shelter without distinction, and are forced to lead an equal life in material matters.
5. Chinese soldiers cannot become a Party member by merely volunteering. They must be selected first by their superiors. Responsible Party members select soldiers in whom they recognize qualities that will make them apt subjects for Communist indoctrination. After investigating their origins and personal careers, soldier Party-members in the same squad as those selected are instructed to observe their speech and conduct. If they report on the candidates favorably after several days of observation, the "leader" of the company (political officer at company level) cross-examines the candidates again. Those who are successful in these tests are formally invited to join the Party by two Party members who have been in the Party for more than two years. Upon their recommendation, a conference of the leading members of the Party branch is held, and usually the recommendation is approved. The candidates then become probationary Party members, and are promoted to regular Party membership after a period of from two to twelve months.
6. Prevention of reactionary tendencies is carried out by strict measures. The staff of the surveillance sub-section in the political section generally attends to this duty. Each Party man in every Party cell is assigned the task of superintending one or two non-Party men. The Party member reports every day to the chief of the unit Party cell the result of his daily observations. Further, members may be assigned the duty of observing other Party members, so the result is that the daily speech and conduct of all officers and men in the Chinese Communist Army are on record in the surveillance sub-sections. Consequently, no one, whether a Party member or not, may express discontent or dissatisfaction, or criticize Communism, and must obey absolutely the orders and instructions of his superiors. Should anyone criticize or act contrary to orders and instructions, a criticizing or debate meeting is held at once, in which the offender must analyze and report the motives for his faulty conduct or incorrect comment, and at the same time he must decide the punishment to be inflicted upon himself. If there are any flaws in his confession or in his recommendation for punishment, he will be criticized and punished further by his colleagues. This is called a "debating."
7. Most soldiers in the Chinese Army feel that if one is branded an anti-revolutionary at one of these debatings, the anguish the accused suffers mentally and physically is more agonizing than if one were shot. Therefore, they believe this method of punishment to be more effective than all former methods, including punishment at the commander's administrative discretion, and by court-martial. Consequently, in the Chinese Communist Army "supervising" troops have been abolished, and there is no court-martial in which military offenders are judged. Thus, the system strengthens the power of the Party, maintains order and discipline, and assures strict obedience to orders by using self-trial, mutual supervision, and the influence of the group or mass of soldiers on the individual, much as social pressure acts on a civilian group.
8. Cooperation of the troops in carrying out military duties is assured in the following manner. When an order is delivered to a unit, the commander and the officer in charge of political affairs in the unit discuss it and decide how the order is to be carried out. Then the officer in charge of political affairs assembles the unit Party members, tells them their duties and the methods to be employed in discharging the duties, and induces them to bear a part voluntarily in carrying the duties out. Then he and the unit commander call out all the personnel of the unit and announce the order and the method of its execution. The troops are asked to discuss problems connected with the execution of the order. In this discussion, the Party members speak as

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they have been instructed to do on the assigned duties, in order to control the discussion and lead the soldiers to "reach" the decision already made. As a result, all the soldiers receive the impression that they have had a part in making the decision which they are to carry out, and therefore exert their best effort and fight courageously at the risk of their lives, feeling they cannot act contrary to a decision which they themselves have helped make. This is an ingenious method of applying psychology in the handling of troops.

9. Even when the situation is so pressing that there is no time to go through all the above procedures, the chiefs of the various party cells are given instructions and told how to lead the members of the cells in carrying out the orders. During combat, stronger emphasis is put on mutual supervision and the surveillance of others. One cannot retreat at will or act cowardly. This is because meetings are held directly after battles to commend officially those who were brave and to punish those who were cowardly.
10. Chinese Communist soldiers are not allowed time to attend to or speculate on their private affairs, but are kept busy with actual combat or, when not fighting, with work, education, lectures, discussion groups, and criticism meetings. In addition, army leaders seek to assure the cooperation of the populace in the areas where the army is located by prohibiting ordinary soldiers from requisitioning or commandeering footstuffs or goods or otherwise making contact with the people, and by providing that only trained and educated members of the political sections engage in these activities.

#### Relationship between Military and Political Commanders

11. There are two channels of command in the Chinese Communist Army; the military and the political. The military commander is responsible for military education, training, combat, supply, sanitation, and personnel administration, while the political commander supervises though education, cultural education, propaganda, party affairs, popular trends, prevention of reactionary political ideas, personnel administration in these fields, and the treatment of prisoners of war. All military orders are delivered to subordinate military and political commanders by the superior unit military commander and bear his signature and are countersigned by the political commander or commissar. On the other hand, political orders need not have the counter-signature of a military commander when delivered.
12. In carrying out a military order, a military commander is expected to obtain the consent of the political officer in his unit. When the opinions of a unit commander and a political commander do not agree, a meeting of the Party branch committees in the unit is held. There the matter is discussed and a decision is made. If either the commander or the commissar is dissatisfied with the decision, he may report to his superiors on the matter and ask for instructions. In time of emergency, the unit commander is authorized to make and carry out a decision on his judgement alone, but a military commander rarely does not because he would become wholly responsible. In the Chinese Communist Army all the battalion commanders and battalion political officers and the corresponding leaders of higher echelons are members of the Communist Party, and therefore generally little conflict in opinion arises. This double system is effective in securing the power of the Communist Party, but adversely affects the speed and mobility of a unit in combat.

#### Control of Former Chinese Nationalist Troops in the Chinese Communist Army

13. The Chinese Communist Army reached its present strength partly by incorporating Chinese Nationalist soldiers who surrendered to Communist forces. The Nationalist units which surrendered in a body can be classified into three groups. The units which belong to the first group, like the Chinese Nationalist 60th Corps which surrendered in Changchun, Manchuria in 1948, are those which surrendered voluntarily without fighting, after having forced their commanders to notify the Chinese Communists of their desire to do so, and which support Communism. Those belonging to the second group are units which surrendered by negotiation during an armistice from combat, like FU Ts'o-yi's army in Peiping. The third group is composed of units which fought desperately against the Communists and surrendered only when they were compelled to do so by overwhelming force.
14. In the case of the first group, the units were incorporated directly into the Chinese Communist Army, their original officers and unit organization were retained, and only the personnel of the political sections were newly attached to the unit. Of the second group, the original organizations were retained for a few months, and then gradually officers were replaced by members of the Com-

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Communist Party, and under the pretense of training the replaced officers were put into the "Liberal Officers Training Group." Enlisted men from the same units were mixed in with regular troops from Chinese Communist units, and new unit designations were given. Units in the third group were broken up from the beginning, and the personnel, both officer and enlisted, used as replacements for Communist units. Therefore, only units belonging to the first group still retain the original organization and in some cases the designations they had when in the Nationalist Army. All others have been dispersed and absorbed into the Communist Army. There are no certain figures on units of the first group. Apparently only the 50 Army of this group was sent to Korea, and it lost two-thirds of its strength in combat in areas south of the Han River and Suwon.<sup>1</sup> Thus its replacements will be from regular Communist units, and it must be assumed the unit as a whole will be thoroughly indoctrinated in the future.

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Comment. [REDACTED] similar details regarding the Chinese Communist Party structure within the military, from independent sources.

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1. Comment. Other reports have stated that most of the Chinese Communist troops in Korea were former Nationalist Army soldiers, and it was reported in mid-June 1951 that half the Chinese Communist casualties were former Nationalist troops, which made the Communist units more uniform and easier to control; [REDACTED] 25X1A

Enclosure: Attachment a of 1 Page.